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What is a nation?  
 
The heart of ethnic nationalism is völkisch, a Ger-
man concept which is difficult to translate. It is 
based on German romanticism and the German 
cultural and spiritual reactions to the Enlighten-
ment and the idea of universality derived from 
the French revolution. The Blut und Boden (blood 
and soil) concept, and the idea that some races 
were historically bound to certain definite areas, 
contrasted with this. 
 
The nation is thus seen as a birthmark. People 
are born as Germans, Swedes, Frenchmen or 
Turks. People with foreign origins are            
considered a threat to national unity and purity 
and to a national culture which defines itself vis
-a-vis “the other”. The common ancestry is the 
end of history and has to be protected against 
everything foreign. 
 
Every people is not only entitled to its own sov-
ereign state but it also owns a historical prede-
termined area once and for all time for its own 
exclusive use. Areas once inhabited by a        
national group should rightfully be returned to 
them, by force if necessary, and with the expul-
sent inhabitants as the outcome. Anyone       
leaving this mythical fellowship is stamped for-
ever with the mark of Cain. To this kind of na-
tionalist, it is inconceivable that people with   
different national backgrounds could live      
together. Minorities are tolerated at best, but 
they are and remain second class citizens.  
 
Myths about Race, National Unity and Purity 
 
With few exceptions – Iceland for example – 
governments and peoples can not demonstrate 
a long, unbroken, historical continuity and eth-
nic homogeneity. The cradle of nations does not 
lie in a mythological obscurity, on the historical 
battlefields of Troy or Kosovo Polje but between 
the covers of history books. In many cases, na-
tions were created by romantic nationalistic his-
torians. They began looking for common de-
nominators for a nation to be. Thus, history, 
language, national soul, “Volkgeist”, culture 
and race came to play their part. 
 
The written language played an important role 
in creating a nation. Language did not therefore 
precede the nation. Instead the emerging na-
tional state created its national language in  
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order to legitimize itself. According to a classic 
definition, the difference between a language and 
a dialect is that a language has a government and 
an army. 
 
National conscription, compulsory education and 
the development of mass media with supra-
regional distribution were the channels used by 
the architects of nations in the 19th century in or-
der to create contact between the centre and the 
periphery, and borders that appeared natural on 
the basis of geography, language, ethnicity or re-
ligion. In particular, the emergence of national 
education systems and the mass media contrib-
uted to communicating a sense of affinity to a 
national collective, to extending the cultural hori-
zons and getting away from provincial narrow-
mindedness. The creation of national symbols 
and myths and re-writing of history were also 
part of the process of nation-building. 
 
A nation can thus be described as an idea search-
ing for a reality which a minority often violently 
forced upon a majority with standardization as a 
goal and with an iron glove as an instrument to 
eradicate previous diversity. Nations were thus 
constructed and invented. People felt that they 
primarily belonged to a province, a town or an 
empire rather than a national state, and they sel-
dom protested when they were transferred from 
one kingdom to another. Eric Hobsbawn spoke of 
a mass production of nations in the 19th century, 
when cultural hallmarks were created for later 
presentation as authentic and ancient. The “real” 
aspects needed the “fake” and “foreign” in order 
to define themselves. The weakness and lack of 
credibility of the national identities which were 
proclaimed, meant that they needed polarization 
in order to take root. 
 
The order of precedence of the factors that charac-
terise a nation has always been subject to discus-
sion – ranging from mutual traditions and collec-
tive political awareness, common antecedents, 
affiliation to a tribe or people, joint territory, cus-
toms and language, culture and religion. Objec-
tions can be made to all these factors. The 
inhabitants of the USA are a nation notwith-
standing their widely differing origins. The 
Swiss are undoubtedly a nation despite their 
different languages, religions and cultures, 
while not all those who speak the German lan-
guage are members of the German nation. 
 
Any attempt to give a content to the concept of 
the nation must therefore automatically imply a 
distortion of reality. Karl Popper, the philoso-
pher, stated at the end of the Second Wold War 
that: 
“It has been said that a race is a collection of 
people who are united, not by their origin but 
by a common misconception about their antece-
dents. Similarly, we can say that a nation is a 
collection of people united by a common mis-
conception about their history”. 
 
The shaping of a nation can be both a progres-
sive and a regressive process. It can come to a 
definite end, pause but return with renewed 
strength, as we have seen in the former Yugo-
slavia and the former Soviet empire. In the early 
14th century Dante wrote about “Slavs, Hun-
garians, Germans, Saxons, the English and other 
nations”, describing his own nationality as 
“Florentine”. Nowadays, only the Hungarian, 
German and English nations remain. The Sax-
ons were absorbed by the last two, for various 
historical reasons. However, the German nation 
did not come to include the equally Germanic 
Friesian, Dutch, Flemish and Luxembourg na-
tions and Dante’s Slavs divided into some ten 
different peoples each of which now considers 
itself a separate nation.  
 
The supposedly original population of France, 
the Franks, were only a small proportion of the 
mixed groups of Romans, Gauls, Celts, Bretons, 
Normans, Burgundians, etc., who gradually 
spread outwards from the Ile de France to be-
come present-day France. In the Seine basin 
alone they probably only represented some ten 
per cent of the population in the 6th and 7th 
centuries.  
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Thus France does not consist of ethnic Franks. 
Instead, a number of ruling families with a Frank-
ish element, succeeded in forming other immi-
grant groups into a unit, a group that, until the 
French revolution, only consisted of the upper 
echelons of society. Even after the Revolution, the 
lower strata of the population remained as they 
were, farmers, peasants, soldiers and craftsmen 
from Normandy, Provence, Aquitaine, Gascony 
or Brittany, speaking many languages. During the 
French Revolution, the inhabitants of Marseilles 
did not understand the language in which the 
Marseillaise was sung. The state came first and 
the national collective was established later 
within its territorial framework as a result of a 
gradual cultural standardization. Peasants in 
France could not be described as Frenchmen until 
the Third Republic at the end of the 19-th century 
and the Basque, Breton, Corsican and Catalonian 
areas of France still do not feel fully integrated 
into the French state and nation. 
 
In present-day France, the third of the country 
situated in the north east is ethnically more Ger-
manic than southern Germany. The north of Ba-
varia is still today called Franconia, and Charles 
the Great, or Charlemagne, represents a central 
chapter in the history of both France and Ger-
many. Frenchmen thus  become Germans and  
Germans French. If we continue even further back 
in time, the picture changes again. 
 
The French historian Ernest Renan wrote 125 
years ago: “There is no doubt that Lorraine once 
belonged to the German nation, but almost every-
where where inflamed German patriots invoke 
ancient German rights we can substantiate the 
existence of even older Celts, and before them the 
Allophylian people, the Finns and the Laplanders 
lived there, and before that there were cave peo-
ple and orangutans before them. There is only 
one right in such a historical philosophy, and that 
is that of the orangutans who were unjustly 
driven out by an evil civilisation.” 
 
According to ecclesiastical law, the German na-
tion originally included the peoples of Scandina-
via, Poland and Bohemia. Frederick the Great of 
Prussia normally conversed in French, and 
spoke only broken German. The King of Prus-
sia’s appeal to his people during the Napoleonic 
War of 1812 was also made in Sorbian and Pol-
ish. When Prussia became the nucleus of a 
united Germany in 1871, it had more Polish 
than German inhabitants. The British are not a 
homogenous nation, either. The Celtic Britons 
who had not been driven into the western 
fringes of the country in the 5th century by the 
Germanic Angles and Saxons were later ab-
sorbed by the invaders. A further ethnic mix 
occurred after the Danish invasion in the 9th 
century and the Norman Conquest in the 11th 
century. 
 
The mother tongue of Cavour, the founder of 
the Italian nation, was French. He had primarily 
dreamt of an Italy based on a Turin-Milan axis. 
One of the leaders of the Italian “Risorgimento”, 
Massimo d’Azeglio, said in 1860: “Having cre-
ated Italy, we must now create Italians.” 150 
years later, there is still reason to question how 
deeply rooted the Italian identity is. Many Ital-
ians regard present-day Italy as a foreign inven-
tion and consider themselves to be primarily 
Florentines, Venetians, Neapolitans, Bolognese 
etc. The antagonism between north and south is 
expressed in the political party Lega Nord 
which would like to free the industrial and 
modern north from what it considers to be the 
poor “African” south. 
 
The Polish and Hungarian nations in the 17th 
century consisted of nobles who, together with 
the king, lived off the labour of the peasants and 
craftsmen. Still in the 19th century, the peasant 
population living to the north-east of Warsaw 
spoke a language called Mazowiane, and de-
scribed themselves as Mazovians. At the begin-
ning of the 19th century, only 40 per cent of the 
population in Hungary were Hungarians. Their 
numbers doubled during the next 125 years, 
while other ethnic groups increased by only 70 
per cent. This was not due to their higher nativ-
ity but to the fact that the Slovaks, Serbs, Ger-
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mans and Jews who moved into the cities from 
the countryside were transformed into a Hungar-
ian middle class and proletariat. Two of the most 
common Hungarian family names are Horvat and 
Toth which in Hungarian means Croat and Slo-
vak.  
 
The wars in former Yugoslavia were not caused 
by a nationalism with medieval roots but origi-
nated from the nationalist ideas that arrived in 
South-Eastern Europe from the West in the 19th 
century. Both real and alleged political events 
from the 14th century onward were cited as justifi-
cation for cruelty. The conflict between the Serbs 
and Croats had its origins in the 20th century and 
began, in military terms, with the establishment 
of the Croatian Ustashi state in 1941.  
 
The Serbian minority in the Habsburg Empire co-
operated politically with the Croats until the 
breakdown of the double monarchy. The idea of a 
southern Slav state was first put forward by a 
Croat, the Catholic Bishop Strossmayer, who, as 
his name reveals, had Germanic forbears. 
 
An artificially constructed ethnic definition of citi-
zenship allowed the individual no choice. The 
Serbian war for the creation of a Greater Serbia 
was an extension of this principle. As long as all 
Serbs were not gathered in one state, the existence 
of the Serbian nation was considered to be under 
threat, and in the same way all Croats had to be 
incorporated into a new Greater Croatia, accord-
ing to the Croatian nationalists. 
 
The Serbian and Croatian argument against the 
Muslims was that “we have always been here 
while you have been here only since the 15th cen-
tury”. This is not only incorrect but also elicits the 
next question as to why the 15th century should 
be selected as the point of departure for territorial 
claims. Following this method of reasoning, we 
might ask why the Slavs who arrived in the Bal-
kans in the 6th and 7th centuries should not be 
sent back to the parts of north-eastern Europe 
where they came from, and why all Orthodox 
Christians should not be returned to Byzantine/
Istanbul? According to Serbian and Croatian 
logic, the former Yugoslavia should be emptied 
of all people except the Albanians, whose pres-
ence can be proved farthest back in time. 
 
Tension in the Balkans rose further with the 
Greek claimed the sole rights to the name Mace-
donia. The conflict between Athens and Skopje 
is another example of how preposterous a na-
tionalism based on historical myths becomes 
when subject to close inspection. On the Greek 
side, a straight line is drawn from 2,300 years 
ago, from Alexander the Great to the present. In 
the early years of the 6th century Greece was 
exposed to such a massive Slav immigration in 
the Middle Ages that the area was often called 
“Slavinia”. In the early 19th century, for exam-
ple, 24 per cent of the Athenian population were 
Albanians, 32 per cent Turks and only 44 per 
cent Greeks. Nor was the Greek war of libera-
tion from the Turks in the 1820’s an out-and-out 
Greek war. The Suliote heroes, about which 
Lord Byron wrote, were Albanians. 
 
Eric Hobsbawm writes about the Greeks who 
took part in the Greek war of liberation: “The 
real Greeks who fought for what would be the 
founding of a new independent national state 
did not speak classical Greek any more than 
Italians speak Latin. The glories of Pericles, Aes-
chylos, Euripedes, Sparta and Athens meant 
nothing to them, and to the extent that they 
were aware of the history they found it irrele-
vant. Paradoxically, they were closer to Rome 
than to Greece (Romaica), i.e., they saw them-
selves as the heirs of Byzantium. They fought as 
Christians against the unbelieving Muslims, as 
Romans against the Turkish dogs.” 
 
Macedonia, whose name is the reason for the 
current dispute, was a divided area at the turn 
of the century, with different languages, relig-
ions, ethnic groups and identities. Hobsbawn 
gives the following description of the area in 
about 1870: 
 
“The inhabitants of Macedonia had been distin-
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guished by their religion, or else claims to this or 
that part of it had been based on history ranging 
from the medieval to the ancient, or else an ethno-
graphic arguments about common customs and 
ritual practices. Macedonia did not become a bat-
tlefield for Slav philologists until the twentieth 
century, when the Greeks, who could not com-
pete on this terrain, compensated by stressing an 
imaginary ethnicity... The Greeks later described 
the inhabitants in the parts of Macedonia that 
they annexed as “slavophone Greeks”. In other 
words, a linguistic monopoly masked as a non-
linguistic definition of the nation”. 
 
Thessaloniki, where the surge of Greek national-
ism was at its peak with the slogan “Macedonia is 
forever Greek”, had a population in the early part 
of the 20th century which was almost 60 per cent 
Jewish, while the Greek and Turkish populations 
each amounted to 18 per cent. Among these Turks 
was the young man who would become Kemal 
Atatürk, the founder of modern Turkey. Northern 
Egypt with its quarter of a million Greeks concen-
trated in Alexandria and large parts of Turkish 
Asia Minor were substantially more Greek than 
the part of Macedonia which now belongs to 
Greece. It was only after the exchange of popula-
tion with Turkey after the First World War, 
agreed by treaty and carried out by force, that 
there was a Greek majority in the area. 
 
The Bulgarians are a mirror image of the Greek 
case. The Bulgarians were originally a Turkic  
people who migrated to Eastern Europe in the 7th 
century, encountering and conquering Slav tribes 
who had come into the area in the previous cen-
tury. But while Slavs who migrated to Greece 
were assimilated, the Bulgarians became Slavs to 
such an extent that only their name reminds of 
their origins. There is not a single word in mod-
ern Bulgarian which can be traced to the people 
who gave the language its name. 
 
The Romanian identity provides yet another dem-
onstration that myths are stronger than facts. Ac-
cording to the national Romanian myth, the Ro-
manians are the result of a merging of the 
Dacians, a Thracian people, and Latin Romans. 
The Dacian-Romans disappeared from history 
when the Roman legions departed in the 3rd 
century AD, but according to Romanian ac-
counts, they settled in inaccessible mountain 
regions where they survived invasions by the 
Teutons, the Slavs, the Magyars and the Tartars, 
reappearing in the 11th century as the Vlachs, a 
Latin-speaking nation. 
 
It has been historically proved that these Vlachs, 
small numbers of whom are now spread all 
over the Balkans in the form of splinter groups, 
were assimilated by the Slavs and the Tartars. 
This Slavic element was particularly empha-
sized in the early years of the communist era in 
Romania, and the history books even went so 
far as to claim that the Dacians were a Slav peo-
ple. Subsequently, when Ceaucescu began to 
develop policies which were independent of 
Moscow, the Slav connection was denied, and 
the Dacian-Roman theory was emphasized, to 
the detriment of the substantial Hungarian and 
German minorities. 
 
The Nation – a Daily Referendum 
 
Thus, nations are not eternally defined entities, 
but they are in fact created. They are “imagined 
communities”, in the words of the American 
anthropologist, Benedict Anderson. National-
ism is a two-faced, Janus-like creature. It is syn-
onymous with self-determination for those who 
have the good fortune to live in a society which 
has its own history, language, culture and relig-
ion, but it can also be xenophobic, intolerant, 
aggressive, hegemonic and authoritarian, lack-
ing the will and ability to allow others what the 
nation claims for itself. 
 
The kind of nationalism which we see today, 
promising a brilliant future on the basis of an 
illustrious past (often artificially constructed 
and mysterious) is not a disease which can be 
cured with quick, radical cures or wished away 
on common-sense grounds. We must be able to 
find an antidote to the fear, hatred and insis-
 Istanbul Kultur University 
Atakoy Campus,Bakirkoy, 34156 Istanbul-TURKEY 
T: +90 212 498 44 76 | F: +90 212 498 44 05 
www.gpotcenter.org 
Page 5 
GLOBAL POLITICAL TRENDS CENTER 
tence on homogeneity on which xenophobia and 
racism thrive, making it clear that these feelings 
have nothing to do with nationalism or national-
ity. If we want to ensure that the nationalists do 
not monopolize discussion about the “nation”, we 
must apply and employ an open the concept of 
the nation. 
 
Adherence to a nation must be an act of choice, 
and not a birthmark. Instead of “ethnos”, in 
which a sense of affinity is based on mythical ra-
cial ties of blood, our perception of the national 
must be a question of “demos” – an open, univer-
salist concept of the nation which focuses on the 
individual level, in which the nation is based on 
acceptance by citizens and their belief in a politi-
cal order which protects their freedoms and 
rights. The individual can choose to join, but he 
can also leave the nation. The nation may be eth-
nically homogenous, but it can also consist of sev-
eral different peoples, as in the case of Switzer-
land. National culture is not static or laid down 
by history, instead it is a dynamic creation based 
on free and independent citizens. 
 
As a result, the starting point in the fight against 
racism and xenophobia must be the concept of 
nationality which was defined by the above men-
tioned Ernest Renan in his classic address at the 
Sorbonne on 11 March 1882, entitled “What is a 
nation?” 
 
As far as Renan was concerned, national affinity 
was not a question of race, religion or place of 
birth, but was instead a matter of “a daily referen-
dum”. 
 
“A nation’s being is based on all individuals hav-
ing something in common, but also an ability to 
forget many things. No Frenchman knows 
whether he is a Burgundian, an Alani or a Visi-
goth. There are hardly ten families in France who 
can prove their Frankish origins, and even if they 
could, evidence of this kind would be incomplete 
due to the many unknown instances of cross-
breeding which put all genealogical systems into 
such disorder... A nation is a spiritual principle, 
with its origins in the deep complexity of his-
tory, an intellectual family, but not a specific 
group shaped by the earth... A nation is a grand 
solidarity constituted by the sentiment of sacri-
fices which one has made and those that one is 
disposed to make again. It supposes a past, it 
renews itself especially in the present by a tan-
gible deed: the approval, the desire, clearly ex-
pressed, to continue the communal life. The ex-
istence of a nation is a daily referendum... 
 
However, nations are not something eternal. 
They have begun, they will end. They will be 
replaced, in all probability, by a European con-
federation. But such is not the law of the 
century in which we live. At the present time 
the existence of nations happens to be good, 
even necessary. Their existence is a guarantee of 
liberty, which would be lost if the world had 
only one law and only one master.” 
 
Renan’s words are still relevant 126 years later. 
National identities and their daily confirmation 
in the form of national frontiers and national 
symbols still set clear limits to a sense of Euro-
pean community. The national state is still de-
mocracy’s principal arena and platform for a 
political debate in which everyone has common 
points of reference, plays by the same rules, ac-
cepts opponents and is able to achieve compro-
mises, and live with them. 
 
Towards a European nation? 
 
The European identity is often described in a 
somewhat high-flown manner as having its 
foundations in antiquity; free thought, individu-
alism, humanism and democracy had their cra-
dle in Athens and Rome. On the other hand, 
neither Greek nor Roman civilizations can be 
described as European. Both were Mediterra-
nean cultures with centers of influence in Asia 
Minor, Africa and the Middle East.  
 
Christianity with its roots in Judaism was also a 
Mediterranean, non-European religion. Byzan-
tium was a Christian power which marked the 
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limit to Roman claims of sovereignty, as did a 
large part of post-Reformation Europe. The result 
of the schism between Rome and Byzantium was 
the development of another culture in Russia and 
south-eastern Europe. Following the Reformation 
a large part of continental Europe was preoccu-
pied for several centuries with religious wars and 
rivalry between Protestants and Catholics.  
 
More recently, historians have played down our 
antique heritage. Instead, European ideals are 
traced back to the Renaissance and the concept of 
the individual as the smallest and inviolable ele-
ment of society. The Enlightenment and the 
French Revolution contributed with the demand 
for freedom, equality, fraternity, democracy, self-
determination, equal opportunities for all, clearly 
defined government powers, separation between 
the powers of church and state, freedom of the 
press and human rights.  
 
The ideas that are triumphant in Europe today are 
those of market economy and democracy. By defi-
nition, this also includes the USA, Canada, New 
Zealand and Australia as European powers. 
However, Europe does not only represent moder-
nity and tolerance but also religious persecution, 
not only democracy but also fascist dictatorship - 
Hitler was the first to use the idea of a European 
house. The collectivist ideals of Communism, co-
lonialism and racism disguised in scientific terms 
also have European roots.  
 
European identity cannot be defined on grounds 
of cultural heritage and history. The explanation 
is as simple as it is obvious. Economic and politi-
cal integration between European nation-states 
has not yet progressed so far that it is possible to 
speak of common interests.  
 
Edmund Burke's wise words that political order 
cannot be created at a drawing board but has to 
emerge gradually thus still has its validity for the 
European integration process. A stable founda-
tion of legitimacy for the EU will only be 
achieved when Europeans perceive a European 
political identity. This does not imply that they 
will no longer feel themselves to be Swedes, 
Finns, Frenchmen, Portuguese, Hungarians, Slo-
vaks or Turks but that the sense of a European 
common destiny is added to these identities. 
Even after more than five decades of European 
integration, this development is still in its in-
fancy and it has been slowed down by the 
enlargement with 12 new member states.  
 
Nation-states evolved after a long period, often 
filled with conflict. They are ideological con-
structions and a national identity is ultimately a 
political standpoint. A prerequisite for a strong 
national identity is that citizens have a sense of 
loyalty to the state because it redistributes social 
resources and provides education, infrastruc-
ture, a legal system etc.  
 
The same prerequisites hold true for the crea-
tors of Europe. As in the process that led to the 
creation of European nation-states, the EU will 
also be an elite project for the foreseeable future 
and the European identity an elite phenomenon. 
To be sure, the technocrats and bureaucrats in 
Brussels are a new European elite but are they 
representatives of an European culture or 
merely an international "civil service" who, with 
the passing of time, increasingly alienate them-
selves from the people whose interests they are 
meant to serve? The problem is that these peo-
ple arouse negative stereotype reactions among 
citizens. Eurocrats are not regarded as the first 
among Europeans but as overpaid bureaucrats 
interfering in matters that do not concern them.  
 
Efforts to create a European identity  
 
The creation of national symbols and myths and 
the rewriting of history were as mentioned 
above part of the process by which European 
nations were formed. Brussels appears to have 
had this in mind when in 1984 decision was 
taken the EC should improve contact with its 
citizens and, so to speak, create a European 
identity, centrally and from above.  
 
At a summit meeting in Fontainbleu, the Euro-
pean Council found it "absolutely essential that 
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the Community fulfils the expectations of the 
European people and takes measures to 
strengthen and promote the identity and image of 
the Community vis-à-vis its citizens and the rest 
of the world".  
 
The Adonnino Committee was set up for this pur-
pose, with the task of starting a campaign on the 
theme "A people's Europe". This initiative was 
based on a quotation from the preamble to the 
Rome Treaty on "an ever closer union among the 
peoples of Europe", and on the Tindemans Report 
of 1975 which said that Europe must be close to 
its citizens and that a European union could only 
become reality if people supported the idea.  
 
An outcome of the work of the committee was the 
decision that the EC should have its own flag. 
When the flag was raised for the first time at Ber-
laymont on 29 May 1986, the EC anthem - the 
"Ode to Joy" from the Fourth Movement of Bee-
thoven's 9th symphony was played for the first 
time. Thus, by means of a flag and European na-
tional anthem, the Union acquired the attributes 
of a nation-state. A European Day was also estab-
lished. The choice fell on 9 May, the date on 
which Robert Schumann held a speech in 1950 
that resulted in the first European community, the 
European Coal and Steel Community.  
 
Consequently, the Adonnino Committee appears 
to have assumed that a European identity could 
be created on the initiative of politicians and bu-
reaucrats. In 1988 the European Council decided 
to introduce a European dimension into school 
subjects such as literature, history, civics, geogra-
phy, languages and music. Legitimacy for future 
integration would be created by invoking a com-
mon history and cultural heritage.  
 
Every European people has however its more or 
less genuine historical myths, experiences and 
view of history. There is no European equivalent 
to the Académie Française, Bastille, Escorial, La 
Scala, Brandenburger Tor or the opening of Par-
liament at Westminster. There is no European un-
known soldier. Common history has been experi-
enced by many as against and not with each 
other in the great European wars. The main task 
of the "Europe-makers" cannot therefore be to 
impose a common identity originating in an-
tique or medieval times on the Europeans but to 
develop a political self-confidence and ability to 
act in line with the role of Europe in the 21st 
century.  
 
A European public opinion must emerge before 
we can talk of a real European citizenship but at 
present, regionalism and nationalism undoubt-
edly have another strength than pan-
europeanism. European trade unions do not 
exist at present, neither other interest groups 
nor, above all, trans-boundary European parties 
and a European general public.  
 
The way towards a genuine European identity 
is thus both difficult and long and more likely to 
be curbed than speeded up by the enlargement 
with 12 new members. It has proved difficult 
enough to bridge the cultural and linguistic dif-
ferences between Catholics and Protestants, 
Latins, Germans, Anglo-Saxons and Scandinavi-
ans in Europe. The task of integrating the Baltic, 
Slav and Orthodox Europeans and later on a 
secular Muslim Turkey will be infinitely more 
difficult. The larger and more heterogeneous 
membership becomes, the greater the need will 
be to differentiate between various member 
states and to create a Europe moving at differ-
ent speeds and thus the political union, the 
monetary union, the common security and de-
fence policy will not extend over the same geo-
graphical areas. A union of up to 30 members at 
varying stages of economic development can 
only function if it is organised along multi-
tracks and at different levels.  
 
Cultural diversity - obstacle or prerequisite for 
a European identity?  
 
European political oratory often maintains that 
Europe can only be defined through its unique 
heritage of diversity and lack of conformity and 
that, paradoxically, its very diversity has been 
its unifying principle and strength.  
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However, European linguistic diversity is proba-
bly the greatest obstacle standing in the way of 
the emergence of a European political identity 
and thus the European democratic project. Multi-
lingual European democracies certainly exist but 
the prime example, Switzerland, has chosen to 
remain outside the EU.  
 
A true democracy is non-existent if most of its 
citizens cannot make themselves understood with 
each other. Rhetoric apart, not even leading Euro-
pean politicians are today able to communicate 
with each other without an interpreter, and very 
few can make themselves understood to a major-
ity of European voters in their own language. 
There is no public European debate, no European 
political discourse because the political process is 
still tied to language.  
 
The question of language is basically one of de-
mocracy. The political discussion would be di-
vided between A and B teams with many ex-
cluded because of their lack of knowledge of for-
eign languages if only English and French were 
the official EU languages. At the same time, the 
problem of interpreting is becoming insurmount-
able. Some form of functional differentiation will 
therefore be necessary, making some languages 
more equal than others. Although this would 
have a negative effect on European public opin-
ion in the small member states.  
 
Before the enlargement an average 66 per cent of 
"the old" EU citizens were monolingual while 10 
per cent spoke at least two foreign languages. Ire-
land is at one extreme with 80 and three per cent 
respectively, while only one percent of the popu-
lation in Luxembourg is monolingual and no less 
than 80 per cent speak at least two foreign lan-
guages. In order to function as Europeans and 
safeguard our interests, we Swedes must become 
tolerably fluent in at least one other major Euro-
pean language apart from English. Swedish re-
mains the basis of our cultural heritage and do-
mestic political discussions, but in order to play a 
constructive part in Europe we must develop into 
citizens of Luxembourg as far as language is 
concerned.  
 
A collective political identity is created by shar-
ing experiences, myths and memories, often in 
contradiction to those held in other collective 
identities. They are, moreover, often strength-
ened by the comparison with those that are dis-
tinctly different. Not just Robert Schumann, Al-
cide de Gasper, Jean Monnet and Konrad Ade-
nauer should be counted among the fathers of 
European integration, but Josef Stalin as well. 
The Cold War enabled a sense of unity to be 
mobilized among Western Europeans, but who 
can play the role of opposition now in order to 
provide Europeans with a common identity?  
 
There is an inherent danger that Europe will 
choose to define itself vis-à-vis its surrounding 
third world neighbours and that the Mediterra-
nean will become the moat around the Euro-
pean fort. The creation of a pan-European iden-
tity risks being accompanied by a cultural exclu-
sion mechanism. The insistence from some 
quarters to include references to Europe´s 
Christian heritage in a European constitution 
and the resistance to a Turkish membership on 
religious grounds are examples of these tenden-
cies. The search for a European identity in the 
form of demarcation against "the others" would 
lead to a racial cul-de-sac while at the same time 
the mixing of races continues to rise in Europe. 
A European identity must therefore be distinc-
tive and all-embracing, differentiate and assimi-
late at the same time. It is a question of integrat-
ing the nations of Europe, with their deeply-
rooted national and, often, regional identities 
and to persuade citizens to feel part of a supra-
national community and identity. 
 
Can a continent with 500 million citizens and 23 
official languages really be provided with a de-
mocratic constitution? In the ideal scenario for 
the emergence of a European political union, the 
European Parliament must first be "de-
nationalised" and this assumes a European 
party system. Secondly, it must have the classic 
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budgetary and legislative powers. The Council of 
Ministers must be turned into a second chamber 
and the Commission should be led by a "head of 
government" appointed by Parliament. 
 
National parliaments would consequently lose 
their functions. They would be transformed into 
regional parliaments and would thus have the 
same position vis-à-vis Brussels as the parlia-
ments in the 16 federal German states have today. 
It is easier said than done to abolish the democ-
ratic deficit by giving greater powers to the par-
liament in Strasbourg, because the dilemma of 
representation versus effectiveness would imme-
diately come to a head. If every parliamentarian 
represented about 25,000 citizens, as is the case in 
Sweden, the gathering at Strasbourg with 27 
member nations would have to be increased to 
more than 19,000. If in the name of efficiency, the 
number was reduced to 500, with constituencies 
of more than a million citizens and everyone was 
guaranteed an equal European vote, Luxem-
bourg, Malta and Cyprus would not be repre-
sented at all and Sweden would have a maximum 
of 8 representatives in the European Parliament. 
It might be capable of functioning but could not 
by any means claim to represent a European elec-
torate. The democratic deficit would continue.  
 
Europe as an entity can only be achieved with the 
help of and not against nations and their special 
characteristics. Therefore the future of the EU 
rests in the common interests of member states 
and not in the political will of a European people 
for the simple reason that such a this does not ex-
ist.  
 
Instead regional and national identities will grow 
in importance in a world that is becoming ever-
more difficult to oversee and which is evermore 
rapidly changing. Citizens will be living more 
and more in a state of tension between several 
loyalties, their home district, state, nation, Europe 
and the international community, increasingly 
required to think globally but act locally. New 
ancient regimes and new regions are emerging 
everywhere in Europe. By actively supporting the 
process of regionalization, Brussels and individ-
ual capitals can show that EU is taking its insti-
tutions closer to its citizens and thereby creating 
greater scope of cultural and linguistic diversity 
than the nation-states have been capable of do-
ing. By contributing to a new vision - the 
Europe of diversity and regional government 
based on subsidiarity - the idea of Europe can 
be made more comprehensible and attractive.  
 
In this way, the regional identity can strengthen 
the emerging European identity. Now that re-
gions are increasingly turning to the EU in their 
fight for resources for regional development 
and to attract investment, Brussels and the EU 
will be seen as regionally friendly rather than 
the national capital.  
 
The nation-state is thus being nibbled at from 
two directions. At the same time, we will ex-
perience a renaissance for nation-states and re-
gions and their gradual merger in a transna-
tional community. Those who support the re-
gion and nation must not necessarily reject 
Europe, but the traditional nation-state with 
community-based traditions, identity and loy-
alty will remain indispensable as a strength and 
source of political stability. Nation-states are 
therefore essential in order to legitimize a new 
European order but structural asymmetry, con-
flicting interests and unexpected courses of de-
velopment will lead to relations between the 
nation-state and European integration that are 
difficult to manage and oversee.  
 
A forced unifying process produces counter re-
actions in all the member countries. A European 
identity is possible only where there is a com-
munity of interests among the citizens. The sin-
gle market will increase the mobility over the 
borders and thereby slowly contribute to the 
emergence of a European identity but it will be 
one of many complemented by different na-
tional and regional identities such as, for exam-
ple, Benelux, Ibero-Europe, the Nordic countries 
and a within the EU reunited Czechoslovakia.  
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The increased mobility and the growing immigra-
tion from non-European countries will strengthen 
the multicultural component that is indispensable 
for a new sense of identity. A European 'supra-
nationality' will however first be accepted when 
there is no hierarchy of national, regional and su-
pra-regional identities but when every individual 
sees them as self-evident and as part of their daily 
life. A policy for preserving diversity will thus be 
a precondition for creating a European identity, 
that would not replace the national identities but 
instead create support and strength for political 
institutions that are neither national nor the 
framework of a European superstate.  
 
The hitherto clear links between state and nation 
will thus grow looser. European integration from 
this point of view will not mean that a new super-
state will appear but that power is spread out. 
Cultural identities will remain rooted at the na-
tional level but will at the same time spread fur-
ther down to ever more distinctive regional iden-
tities. We will have neither a new European su-
perstate nor sovereign nation-states. Nations will 
not disappear but we will have nations with 
smaller states and national cultures with softer 
outer casings.  
 
Cultural nations will thus become divorced from 
a territory. People will have a sense of belonging 
to a special area and its cultural and political his-
tory but this area need not necessarily be linked 
to a nation-state with defined territorial bounda-
ries. The European political identity could emerge 
in this way while at the same time leaving the cul-
tural national or regional identity intact while 
European diversity will not only remain but even 
flourish. The democratic deficit can never be abol-
ished unless this kind of development takes place, 
nor would the project of a European Union be 
realized.  
 
With the enlargement the European Union will in 
the foreseeable future become a community of 
states without a precedent – something more than 
a lose association of states but not a federal state 
in the classical sense. It will to quote Jacques 
Delors be "an unidentified political object". 
 
At the same time, Europe is moving towards the 
confederation which Renan referred to. The 
classic national state was born in the 19th cen-
tury, in a world which was characterized by self
-sufficiency and a high degree of economic in-
dependence, very little spatial and social mobil-
ity and limited communications with others. As 
a result, the state and its territory constituted an 
entity which was self-sufficient and finitely de-
fined, not just in its national ideology, but also 
in reality. As a result of economic integration, 
mass tourism, refugee movements, satellite TV, 
etc, this epoch has long since passed.  
 
National frontiers have not only become more 
open; they are being steadily eaten away and 
diversity within them is increasing. As was the 
case in the process in which European national 
states developed, the European Union will con-
tinue to be an elite phenomenon. The lack of 
interest which can still be seen in elections to the 
European Parliament shows that there is a long 
way to go. There is lukewarm media interest, 
the candidates are often unknown and the poll 
figures are low. What drives people to the ballot 
box is more dissatisfaction with domestic poli-
tics than a sense of participation in a European 
political process. 
 
Hence Europe is neither a “communication-
community” nor an “experience-community”, if 
we try to anglicize two German concepts. Nev-
ertheless both these factors are essential for the 
development of a collective political identity. 
An identity of this nature is built up on the basis 
of shared experience, myths and memories – 
often in opposition to similar elements in other 
collective identities, as mentioned before. 
 
Therefore the principal assignment for the 
“makers of Europe” cannot be to try to give 
Europeans a common identity based on a dis-
tant past in antiquity or the Middle Ages, but 
instead to develop political self-confidence and 
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an ability to take action which corresponds to 
Europe’s role in the next century. Hence, a Euro-
pean identity will not be established by central 
directives from Brussels or from the capitals of 
member states, or conjured up at seminars or con-
ferences. Instead, it will arise because citizens of 
the individual European states feel that they, per-
sonally, have something to gain from integration 
and that, as a result, they say yes to the EU in 
their daily referendum. 
 
Supranationality will not be accepted until there 
is a situation in which national, regional and su-
praregional identities are no longer set in a hierar-
chical order. Everyone must feel that all these 
identities are self-evident and part of their daily 
lives. As a result, a policy based on preserving 
diversity will be a prerequisite for creating Euro-
pean identity which neither should nor can re-
place a national identity, but which is able to sup-
port and strengthen political institutions which 
are neither national nor the framework for a 
European superstate. 
 
Questions which involve cultural policy, educa-
tion and historically based social welfare systems 
and values must therefore continue to be the con-
cern of the national state. This involves rendering 
unto the national state what is the national state’s, 
and to the EU what is the EU’s, that is to say a 
security and foreign policy structure, the single 
market, and a common refugee and immigration 
policy. The relationship between a European 
identity and national identities might then take 
the form of a foreign and security policy, in a 
broad sense, which lays the foundations for a 
common European political identity. This means 
a “nation” in Renan’s sense, in which the individ-
ual can feel a political affinity irrespective of his 
ethnic or geographical origins, without therefore 
needing to feel part of a European “Volk” or of a 
European “national civilization”. 
 
This will loosen up the historical links between 
the state and the nation. In this perspective, Euro-
pean integration does not mean the emergence of 
a new European superstate, but instead a disper-
sion of power. Cultural identity will continue to 
be based on the national level, but it will also be 
disseminated downwards to increasingly 
clearly defined regional identities. We will nei-
ther have a new European superstate nor sover-
eign national states. Nations will not disappear. 
Instead, we will have nations with fewer state 
features, and national cultures with softer 
shells. 
 
At the national level, the German national con-
cept would be retained, but in its original Her-
dian form, in which a nation does not necessar-
ily have to be expressed in the form of a state. 
Johan Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) was both a 
nationalist and an internationalist, who stressed 
the concept of cultural patriotism. No people 
was superior to any other. Resting on secure 
and solid cultural foundations, each nation 
could contribute its special characteristics and 
cultural achievements to an international com-
munity of nations. 
 
If we are to achieve this, a narrow nationalism 
must be replaced by a healthy patriotism char-
acterized by five patriotic commandments 
which Michael Mertes, Chancellor Kohl’s close 
assistant formulated in an article in Frankfurter 
Allgemeine 20 years ago: 
• You shall respect the patriotism of other 
nations as much as you wish your own patriot-
ism to be respected by them. 
• You shall be a loyal citizen of the country 
to which you belong by birth or by free choice. 
• You shall accept and respect your 
neighbour as a compatriot irrespective of his 
ethnic, cultural and religious background, if he 
is prepared to be a loyal citizen of the country to 
which both of you belong. 
• Your love for your country must never be 
divided from your love for liberty.  
• You shall therefore defend your religious 
freedom of religion and freedom of thought, 
and that of your neighbours, and resist all at-
tempts to force you or your neighbour into a 
conflict of loyalties between your civic and hu-
man duties. 
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• You shall not make an idol of your own country, for there are universal values above all na-
tions, including yours. 
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